

Administrative Culture and Political Change: The Philippine Experience, 1961-1987

AMELIA P. VARELA*

Remarkable changes have been noted in the administrative culture of the Philippine bureaucracy under the last three Presidents, namely, (1) the Macapagal era, 1961-1965; (2) Marcos' rule which is further subdivided into three time periods, (a) 1965-1969, (b) martial law and the New Society, 1969-1981, and (c) the New Republic, 1981-1986; and (3) the Aquino administration during the transition from dictatorship to democracy. Lessons learned from the experience are culled under the following headings: (1) new regime-bureaucracy relations; (2) political control of programs and personnel; (3) administrative culture that may develop as a consequence of (1) & (2); and (4) effects of the administrative culture under the Aquino administration.

The Philippine experience in discontinuous political development has demonstrated significant lessons from which public administration and countries undergoing political change can profit. Political change brings certain political instability and tension which in turn affect the stability and continuity of the public service represented by the bureaucracy.

Every new administration gives fresh impetus to an old-age struggle between change and continuity, between political leadership and bureaucratic power (Hecló 1977). Change is provided by the constant turnover of political officials resulting from the electoral process or from other modes of political takeover like *coup d'état* or revolution, while continuity is ensured by the career bureaucracy with its "institutional memory."

Relevant questions about political change on which the Philippine experience can shed some light are:

- 1) How do those interested in political control and those interested in administrative continuity take the measure of each other (new regime-bureaucracy relations)?

*Professor (Retired), College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines.

This article is Chapter 2 of the forthcoming book *Administrative Culture and Political Change* written by the same author.

- 2) To what extent can any political leader hope to guide what government does (programs) by controlling the people (personnel) who implement them and how (Hecló 1977: 2)?
- 3) What kind of administrative culture develops as a consequence of the new regime-bureaucracy interaction and the control which the new political leadership sets on the programs and personnel of the bureaucracy?
- 4) What are the effects of the emergent administrative culture on employee morale, behavior and performance and how does it affect the public service under the new regime?

Any newly elected president comes to office distrusting the bureaucracy (Pfiffner 1987: 57). This distrust, sometimes hostility, is more pronounced when the change in political leadership entails a change in the political party in power, or when the new regime comes to power not by way of an election but by an abnormal change process like a *coup d'état* or a revolution.

This presidential distrust of the career bureaucracy arises from the new regime's perception that the bureaucracy is filled with holdovers from the previous administration who are unsympathetic to the new policy priorities of the incoming administration. It is reflected in the placement of political appointees in critical positions in the higher bureaucracy at the start of the new regime. The bureaucracy is seldom seen by incoming regimes as an effective government machinery ready to carry out the new administration's policies and programs and willing to serve the legitimate political leadership in power.

The bureaucracy has a structure that breeds its own administrative culture. Incoming political leadership often reacts to the bureaucracy it inherits by instituting personnel purges or reorganization or both, either to cleanse the old system and reorient it to the needs of the new dispensation, or to reshape the administrative culture and values to facilitate the achievement of its policy and program objectives. The purges, in most cases, cover the upper levels of the bureaucracy and the lower level casuals which are the entry points for supporters of the new regime. The top posts are critical for policy and program formulation and implementation, while the lower positions for casuals are the means of distributing spoils to a larger number of political supporters.

The greater bulk of the civil service, ideally, remains untouched by politics. It is this part of the bureaucracy which provides the stability of government and continuity of public service during periods of political transition. Career officials and employees are "neutral" and are therefore available and ready to be tapped by legitimate political leadership at the helm of the Executive Branch.

The idea of a civil service rests on three basic principles (Hecló 1977: 20):

- 1) that the selection of subordinate government officials should be based on merit — the ability to perform the work rather than any form of personal or political favoritism;
- 2) that since jobs are to be filled by weighing the merits of the applicants, those hired should have tenure regardless of political changes at the top of organizations; and
- 3) that the price of job security should be a willing responsiveness to the legitimate political leaders of the day.

The civil service idea is seen as a third force in the regime-bureaucracy interface. It may mitigate or soften though it does not entirely eliminate the apparent conflict between political and bureaucratic self-interests. The civil service idea can serve as a balance to the demands of political leadership and bureaucratic power, or to the interaction between the top political officials and career executives in the bureaucracy (Hecló 1977).

This neutral role of the civil service is however not always preserved to carry on the work of government during transition. Comprehensive and drastic reorganization is also resorted to by an incoming administration to create a "counter-bureaucracy" and instill a "counter-culture" especially when the new establishment completely distrusts the bureaucracy it inherited from the past administration (Pffifner 1987).

Administrative Culture during the Macapagal Era: 1961-1965

President Diosdado Macapagal won the elections of 1961 against then incumbent President Carlos P. Garcia. Republic Act No. 2260, also known as the Civil Service Act of 1959 was passed during the incumbency of President Garcia. The implementing rules and regulations were however not signed until September 1962 by President Macapagal and became operative in January 1963.

President Macapagal set the direction of his administration in regard to the civil service when, immediately after he administered the oath of office to Abelardo Subido as Commissioner of the Civil Service in November 1962 he instructed him "to fight for the merit system" (Subido 1972: 20). This legal approach to strengthen the merit system through the full implementation of the law was complemented by the President's moral regeneration program. This program rested on the highest considerations of government integrity, top government leadership by example to combat graft and corruption, and public morality to accompany socioeconomic development.

The Civil Service Commission under Subido waged a relentless drive against immorality, dishonesty, and graft and corruption. Acts of malversation of funds, falsification of public documents, politicking, acceptance of "grease" money or *lagay*,¹ bribery and thefts of money order remittances were investigated and given due process of law. The Commission dismissed from the service some 177 officials, and 477 employees were found guilty of these offenses (De la Torre 1986: 89).

Recruitment and Promotion in the Civil Service

The crusade led by Commissioner Subido to strengthen the civil service and if possible restore it to its "high posture of respectability during the pre-war days" was noted by columnist Alfredo Roces (1963). Before his campaign to uphold the merit system, Subido pointed to the ineffectiveness of the personnel agency in implementing the merit system and stopping the onslaught of political patronage in appointments and promotions in the government service.

He saw the Civil Service Commission as an obscure government agency which politicians took for granted, while interfering in matters of appointment, promotion, and discipline of government personnel.

The first move of the Commission was to conduct competitive examinations to cover positions where there were no rosters of eligibles, to fit the proper eligibility to the functions of the position, and to qualify political proteges who had long been in the service. The move was also intended to speed up the appointments of permanent employees and do away with provisional and temporary appointments, the backdoor entry of proteges to the government service.

In the beginning, only the Executive Branch was placed strictly under civil service coverage. Later, the Commission extended the merit system requirements to the Legislative Branch and the Judiciary which used to operate outside of the system. Likewise, the government-owned and controlled corporations, state universities and colleges including the University of the Philippines, and the police were placed under it.

The campaign for merit brought the Civil Service Commissioner to tangle with high officials and politicians with high influence. Among them were Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, Senate President Amang Rodriguez, and Senators Jose W. Diokno and Arturo M. Tolentino as well as Antonio Villegas, Domacao Alonto, and Ramon Mitra, Jr.

The Commissioner tangled most with Senator Tolentino who had authored two laws creating havoc on the merit system. These were R.A. 1079 which makes the civil service eligibility effective for life and R.A. 1080 which bestows first

grade eligibilities to those who passed the bar or board examinations. The Commission wanted these repealed.

The Commissioner also revoked the permanent appointments extended to 101 chiefs of hospitals who were given eligibilities on the basis of R.A. 1080. It was argued that such eligibility was not appropriate for the position and an examination for those affected was scheduled immediately. However, political attempts to make the Commissioner rescind his order were futile as the examination was nevertheless administered, notwithstanding the appeal to President Macapagal and the order from Executive Secretary Rufino G. Hechanova overruling the Commission's order.

To strengthen the merit system and weaken the encroachment of political interference in the civil service, a merit promotion plan, a performance rating system, and a complaints and grievance procedure were installed. The combined effect of these measures resulted in the operation of the merit system as the general rule for promotions in the civil service, rather than through political patronage.

Career and Employee Development

Government-wide training programs were conducted in order to upgrade the technical and managerial capabilities in the civil service. To strengthen the drive for public morality in government at all levels, and to positively influence the business community to uphold integrity and discourage acts of graft and corruption, distinctly honest employees and citizens were honored at a breakfast in Malacañang. The employee and career development programs included moral regeneration seminars in all departments, bureaus, and agencies.

The moral regeneration drive was however confined to the Executive Branch which was President Macapagal's direct responsibility. The rationale behind this focus on the Executive Branch only was that the President was not in a morally strong position to cover the Legislature and the Judiciary because the Executive Branch was not in its proper ethical order. Malacañang however sought the help of the Legislative Branch by asking for the creation of a Moral Commission. But this Commission was never established, since the Legislative Branch was in the effective control of the opposition. President Macapagal also enunciated his "command responsibility" principle to cover immoral and corrupt acts committed by officials of the Executive Branch.

Professional, executive, and employee development was the concern of human resource development activities. To ensure that this aspect of public personnel administration was addressed continuously, programs for personnel and training officers were made a regular training activity.

A scholarship program in public administration was also launched in universities offering the graduate degree in public administration. The Commission implemented a clerical internship program where trainees received actual office and good work experience in preparation for employment.

Compensation and Incentive System

The question of decent compensation and appropriate motivation for public employees had plagued the civil service since the time of the *alcalde mayor* (provincial governor).² Public employees during the Commonwealth had been characterized as underpaid and of low grade quality. Their economic lot had not improved during the incumbency of President Macapagal. The feeling during these times was that the performance of public functions was not compensable by official salaries, but must be further rewarded with special remuneration from the immediate beneficiaries (Romualdez 1959).

The situation in the 60s was a throwback to as early as 1932. The *Manila Daily Bulletin* commented in an editorial that the government was overstaffed with underpaid employees, thus explaining the low efficiency and morale of the civil service. Bribery of policemen, customs and revenue employees, or immigration officers was a common practice because they were grossly underpaid (De la Torre 1986).

Alleviation of the economic plight of government employees was addressed by Macapagal when he raised the minimum and maximum salaries. However, the meager increases were not adequate to offset the consequences of his decontrol and import liberalization policies. With almost 100% devaluation of the peso (from P2 to P3.90 to a dollar), the real wages of the Filipino workers considerably declined and the consequences were inflation, widespread unemployment, low subsistence level, and poverty.

Political Interference

The practice of political partisanship and interference in public employment is ingrained in our administrative and political systems. The practice is accepted socially with the spoils system and its accompanying political recommendation for employment as standard practice in the civil service.

Subido, the "fightingest" Commissioner who led the Civil Service Commission from 1962 to 1971 delivered the off-limits message to the politicians. He sallied into the "sacred precincts" of power like the Senate, Supreme Court, and House of Representatives. He braved the peril of Congress' nonconfirmation of his appointment as Commissioner, demoted his own brother, and fought with Mayor

Antonio Villegas to promote the merit system against political interference. President Macapagal, seeing the merit of Subido's acts, sustained the latter's revocation of the appointments of chiefs of hospitals due to their inappropriate eligibility.

Despite efforts of the Commission to uphold the merit system, however, political interference could not be stopped. Congressman Joaquin R. Roces, Chairman of the Committee on Good Government observed: "Civil service laws are very good laws, but their implementation has not been easy because of outside interference, mostly from politicians." He noted that a congressman has dual personality: as legislator, he would do everything in his power to uphold the merit system; as a politician, he would violate the very laws he had championed, if it is politically profitable to do so (*Civil Service Reporter* 1961: 1 & 6). Roces also traced the roots of the weakness of the country's merit system to the lack of a strong public opinion.

Employee Perceptions and Behavior

A perception prevailing among employees during the Macapagal era was that civil service rules were strictly applied to applicants and employees alike. There was even excitement, enthusiasm and expectation in regard to reorganization. Reorganization during a political transition was seen as an opportunity for upgrading the ranks or for promoting the career employees. Excitement over the reorganization was caused by the selection of presidential appointees from among the career service/ranks. When President Macapagal constituted his Cabinet, two Nacionalistas under President Garcia who were known for integrity were retained, three were career officials, while the rest were political appointees most of whom were Pampangos.³

The rules and regulations on security of tenure were clear and the guarantee of "due process" gave the civil servants a feeling of fair treatment. Security of tenure of employees also gave the civil service the stability and continuity considered necessary during a political change. The career executives and employees at and below the level of undersecretary remained in office since the general practice was for the bureaucracy to be neutral and to serve "whoever is in power." The general behavior in the bureaucracy is for the corps to follow diligently and dutifully the "orders" of the incoming administration.

The government employees appeared to have resigned themselves to the reality that salaries in the public service always lag behind those obtained in the private sector. This is however offset by closer interpersonal relations between and among officials and employees as shown by a ready support system in cases of misfortune, satisficing compliance with performance standards, and security of tenure.

As a general rule, government employees do not strive for high performance. Excellence or outstanding performance in government is not accompanied by automatic rewards like promotion or salary increase or both. Most employees aim only for satisfactory and very satisfactory performance as a norm, since the common merit advancement available is across-the-board increases which everyone gets anyway.

To eliminate graft and corruption had been President Macapagal's election pledge. In his inaugural speech, he declared:

Our first mission is the solution of the problem of corruption. We assume leadership at a time when our nation is in the throes of a moral degeneration unprecedented in our national history. Never within the span of human memory has graft permeated every level of government. The solution of this problem shall call for the exercise of the tremendous persuasive power of the Presidency. I shall consider it, therefore, my duty to set a personal example in honesty and uprightness. I intend to do more than this. Among the appropriate measures I shall take to insure the eradication of this social cancer is to assume moral and political responsibility for the general state of public morality in the country (Reynolds and Bocca 1965: 170-171).

Majority of public employees expected no less than what the President had promised. They took the competitive examinations required by the merit system. They accepted with gratitude the meager salary increases as an indication of the new regime's concern about their economic plight. Most of them remained honest and performed their jobs as efficiently as they could.

President Macapagal, on the other hand, had to get rid of Garcia's "midnight appointments." Most of these midnight appointees insisted on staying until their tenure of office ran out. They even threatened to take their cases to court. In response, President Macapagal started motions for investigations into their inefficiency and after some delays, he was able to dismiss them from the civil service.

The next problem was the 50-50 plan⁴ whereby casuals were taken in the government service and politicians employed their political wards and proteges to new items in the government plantilla. Initially, the 50-50 plan for casuals was strongly resisted, and at the height of the resistance against it, employee morale was shattered. Later on, however, it was regarded as "one of those things," an accommodation of patronage in the merit system. Some sectors in the public service accepted the 50-50 plan as a normal part of political intramurals.

Notwithstanding these negative developments in the government service, acts of graft and corruption at the lower levels were readily checked through the institution in each agency of investigation committees which meted out "dismissals with cause" to erring officials and employees. The corruption between

government and private business was no more acutely dramatized than in the case of foreign businessman Harry Stonehill. He and his associates were charged by the government with tax evasion, smuggling, and corruption of public officials. Stonehill was found guilty and was later deported. Other businessmen such as Ernesto Ting, Peter Lim, and Bob Stewart were also investigated. As a result of the Stonehill case, President Macapagal fired many government officials for "unethical dealings," and went after members of the Nacionalista and Liberal parties alike in his efforts to stamp out corruption.

During his administration, it can be said that integrity in government service remained intact, though tainted. Minor acts of negative behavior were tolerated like running personal errands on official time, using office supplies, and tampering with the bundy clocks by allowing co-workers to punch in and punch out the time cards of their friends. Tolerance for such practices may have been viewed as concessions to employees who were receiving low salaries anyway.

The intrusion of politics into the civil service under Macapagal went on seemingly unabated. Agencies like the Bureaus of Internal Revenue and Customs, Foreign Affairs Department, Commission on Elections, Philippine Sugar Commission, and government-owned and controlled corporations became vulnerable to political pressures.

Some government corporations were observed to have incurred losses amounting to about P1.28 billions attributed to mismanagement and graft and corruption ranging from "failure to prevent defalcations, shortages, or other irregularities," to the practice of hiring "neophytes and misfits." On several occasions, President Macapagal was asked to "exercise judicious care" and select members of the boards of directors and heads of government corporations on the basis of qualifications and merit rather than political and geographical considerations (Santiago 1964).

Casuals in government swelled their ranks under President Macapagal as the 50-50 agreement was gradually accepted by the civil service since it became the convenient way of accommodating qualified political wards and followers. When Marcos won over Macapagal in the presidential election of 1965, Commissioner Subido, who was retained by Marcos, required all appointments of casual employees to be screened and approved by the Civil Service Commission. Such an effort was aimed perhaps at warding off the hordes of political appointees which rush into the government service after a change in the political leadership.

Meanwhile, it can be said that public confidence in government remained intact under Macapagal, since the merit system still reigned supreme over political patronage. During the first two years of his administration, Macapagal kept his promise for a land reform law; he dismissed erring officials and

employees found guilty of graft and corruption and deported foreigners convicted of corrupting government employees. He and his wife led a simple private life and a public life of integrity which helped minimize graft and corruption in high places. Above all, he set the civil service on its path to merit.

And yet, despite the six percent increase in GNP during his administration, it was observed that the poor remained poor; the big landowners were still in control of vast landholdings; unemployment rates remained high; and peace and order and insurgency problems had escalated. More importantly, no drastic change had been made on the quality of the civil service inasmuch as no techniques were ever developed that could guarantee the triumph of the merit system over partisan politics.

In the end, the Macapagal administration was able to demonstrate that administrative culture and behavior could be patterned after civil service reforms which strictly enforce the merit system. Public employees were observed to remain neutral participants in the administrative process since they were not highly politicized. The people still preferred employment in government despite low salaries, opting for security in tenure.

The drive of Subido for merit in appointments and promotions resulted in the development of strong awareness about the merit system and its requirements, competitive examinations, appropriate eligibilities, and the Civil Service Commission as an important personnel agency of government.

The problem of graft and corruption was treated as evil, illegal and bad for government. Its negative meaning was projected to the public: In the attempt to solve this problem, its alternative interpretation—as an aspect of the Filipino behavior that gives action to the social value of *utang na loob* or *pakikisama* which is socially accepted—had never been considered.

People in the civil service however, continued to express support and confidence in the Macapagal government despite its shortcomings. Positive cultural orientation pervaded government offices. Negative cultural perception and behavior, whenever reported, were considered minimal. In terms of its administrative culture and behavior, government under Macapagal was still alive and healthy.

Administrative Culture Under Twenty Years of the Marcos Rule

The longest presidency ever experienced by the Philippines was that of Ferdinand E. Marcos. His term, which spanned twenty years, can be divided into three distinct periods:

- 1) Marcos Regime I: 1965-1969;
- 2) Marcos Regime II: Martial Law and the New Society, 1969-1981; and
- 3) Marcos Regime III: The New Republic, 1981-1986.

Marcos Regime I: 1965-1969

The Macapagal years, although characterized by efforts toward moral regeneration and upholding of the merit system, failed to bring about socioeconomic progress due to lack of financing. The decontrol and free trade policies brought about economic crises. The opposition-controlled Senate did not respond to calls for tax measures and legislation to enable President Macapagal to avail of public borrowings.

Having joined the opposition, then Senate President Marcos, second man to Macapagal in the party in power (Liberal Party), declined to approve tax measures to raise revenues nor presidential authority to contract loans. Marcos argued that "new taxes are not the answer to our problem" (Macapagal 1968: 381). He was for "reducing the public debt" (Macapagal 1968: 381) and "public borrowing shall be resorted to with extreme caution considering the alarming increase of the public debt" (Macapagal 1968: 381).

The motives behind the actuations of Marcos vis-a-vis the administration of President Macapagal became clear in 1965. Upon being informed by President Macapagal of his decision to run for reelection, Marcos maneuvered his way to the Nacionalista Party and "guested" in his presidential bid against Macapagal (Macapagal 1968: 358).

The people at this time were against the continuance of decontrol and free trade policies. Most of all, the electorate craved for efficient and honest government (Bonner 1987: 26). They were tired of widespread poverty, graft and corruption, favoritism in government and business, and the widening gap between the rich and the poor.

Recognizing in his inaugural speech (Marcos 1965) the crisis caused by decontrol, Marcos nevertheless welcomed foreign investors and international financial institutions in the country calling for "faith in free enterprise" (Marcos 1966: 14). Upon pressure from the World Bank, he betrayed the people who voted him to office as he restored the decontrol program of 1962. In exchange, foreign loans from U.S. and the World Bank poured in and the country's foreign debts spiralled from \$559.5 millions in 1962 under Macapagal to \$1.9 billions in 1966.⁵

As clearly pointed out by former President Diosdado Macapagal in his book (1968), President Marcos had repeatedly reversed his political stand on taxes and foreign debt.

As Senate President, Marcos opposed Macapagal's request for new taxes, but when he became president, he certified as urgent to the 1967 Congress, some 17 tax measures to raise revenues estimated at over ₱500 million. In 1968, he proposed to Congress additional tax bills to raise ₱1 billion.

Again, during the incumbency of Macapagal, Marcos was for the reduction of the foreign debt. But as President, he called a special session of Congress on 15 August 1966 to approve as urgent the amendment of RA 16 and RA 1000 previously recommended by Macapagal. The amendments, RA 4860 and RA 4861, were signed by Marcos into law on 8 September 1966 authorizing him to contract new borrowings/loans amounting to ₱6 billion.

Policy of Retrenchment. President Marcos announced his policy of retrenchment in his inaugural speech. The first to go under the policy were the casual employees in the government service. To the cynics, the mass layoff was not retrenchment but simple replacement. The casuals employed by the Macapagal administration under the 50-50 plan were removed to give way to the new crop of carpetbaggers who had arrived with the bandwagon of the new political regime (Flores 1966: 12).

No one can argue with President Marcos to "install without delay a policy of rigorous fiscal restraint." But singling out the casuals—the lowliest among government workers—to make the initial sacrifice in the name of retrenchment went against the grain of the presidential pronouncement that "high officials should set the example" in the matter of "self-sacrifice."

When Commissioner Subido ordered all appointments of casual employees to be screened and approved by the Commission, the government employees welcomed it. This would minimize the dumping of casuals into the civil service through the political backdoor.

The worsening economic conditions prevented any increase in the income levels and minimum wages in the public sector. The saving factor for the employees was that prices of basic commodities like food, although higher, were still within reach of most civil servants.

Political Patronage and Recruitment. In contradiction to the austerity measures adopted in regard to the pay scales of government personnel and the dismissal of casuals, the transition period from Macapagal to the Marcos administration was characterized by increased recruitment through political patronage. Being a Liberal, but having run under the banner of the Nacionalista Party, Marcos had a lot of political debts to pay.

Political proteges with high educational/professional qualifications and experience were conveniently tucked in positions which were "policymaking, primarily confidential, and highly technical" while the rank and file were categorized as "casuals" and paid out of pork barrel fund.⁶

Although this kind of recruitment would defeat the very policy of retrenchment adopted earlier, the new administration had no other recourse but to accommodate those who helped it gain power.

The Merit System. In the meantime, the Civil Service Commission under Subido had not relented in upholding the merit system. The Commission established an examination program composed of (1) a seven-year teacher examination program; (2) an examination program for professions geared to economic development like those for economics, mining, agriculture, forestry, fishing and community development; and (3) the regular examination program covering general clerical, career service, supervisors, statisticians and stenographer examinations. The five-year examination program for the police was instituted in 1968. These examination programs were designed to improve the recruitment and promotion systems and to guarantee merit and fitness in appointments to relevant positions in the civil service.

During the ensuing years, attention was focused on improvements in the areas of police service, public school teachers, and the general clerical force.

To ensure proper regulation of the police service, a Police Commission was created which aimed to emancipate the police forces throughout the country "from the clutches of politicians" (*Civil Service Reporter* 1966: 1). This was intended to do away once and for all with the recurrent scandals involving the police under the jurisdiction of local government officials. The measure also aimed to prevent the use of police forces as "private armies" to achieve political ends.

The other recurrent problem at this time was the shortage of eligible teachers to man the teaching posts in the educational system. About 4,000 examinees failed in the 1965 Teachers' Examination. To avert their mass layoff, Commissioner Subido reconsidered to adjust the grades of those who obtained 69% to 70% (passing mark), provided the teachers had at least two years of teaching experience and an average efficiency rating of satisfactory or 85% (*Civil Service Reporter* 1966). Recruitment and promotion in the civil service depended very much on the possession of appropriate eligibilities.

Two big scandals related to civil service examinations broke out in 1967. One was the leakage in the examinations for medical board licensure; the other was the discovery of "fake" eligibilities of about 5,000 public school teachers. The effects of these scandals were far-reaching; they tainted the integrity of civil service examinations and the value of eligibilities which afterwards were regarded "for sale."

Promotions and Career/Employee Development. Meanwhile, the slow promotion process continued in the civil service. A recently conceived promotion plan was strengthened by the establishment of guidelines and standards as well as the new requirement that every agency must submit to the CSC a system of ranking positions in their plantillas. The Commission also enjoined offices to strictly follow the rules in the selection of employees for promotion.

As a complement to the promotion plan, the revised performance rating system was adopted to ascertain employee efficiency, work qualifications and experience, and actual performance. Likewise, there were guidelines for personnel action such as promotion, demotion, or transfer. Dissatisfaction of employees over working conditions was defined, supervisory and interpersonal relationships and other personnel matters were further delineated and a grievance procedure was instituted for the redress of grievances and complaints.

Seminars to fill up the information gaps regarding civil service laws and rules were undertaken among civil servants especially those outside of urban centers. Corollary to these regional information drives, local chapters of the Civil Service Assembly of the Philippines were established to serve as opinion and information centers to help enhance the interests of the civil servants.

A manpower assessment survey was also started in 1969 to provide for a personnel management information system for more rational manpower planning and systematic decisionmaking.

Employee Perception and Behavior. Government employees, despite the practice of political patronage, still viewed the merit system favorably. Because they perceived that the merit system was prevailing over the spoils system, the Civil Service Commission continued to gain the support of employees on measures that uphold merit.

However, the discovery of incidences of examination leakage and anomalies in relation to fake eligibilities weakened the employees' trust and confidence in civil service examinations as a measure of merit and fitness. They became wary and suspicious of the process of examinations, and bruited about the assistance of fixers through *lagay* (grease money or bribe) to gain facile eligibility for entry to government service. Not only were eligibilities for sale, but top and higher positions were allegedly auctioned to the highest bidders. Although they were regarded as the exceptions rather than the general rule, these scandals eroded the confidence of the civil servants and the public in the government. "It's not what you know, but whom you know" and "what are we in power for" were usual remarks (seriously or jestingly made) among government personnel.

As the governing process became more complex and the bureaucracy increased in size and technology, clients found greater difficulty in transacting

business with government. They became dependent upon public officials and employees who in turn realized that the bureaucratic power they possessed could be a convenient tool for exacting "additional compensation" (*lagay* and tips) from the people whom they served. Thus, petty graft and corruption flourished.

Such negative bureaucratic behavior observed among government personnel became accepted by the public so long as the bureaucratic obstacles were facilitated by the employees. Employees, on the other hand, welcomed the perspective, since it was also a convenient way of augmenting low incomes. Such value later on became entrenched in the government service, not as a practice of graft and corruption, but rationalized as part of the Filipino value of *utang-na-loob* and gift-giving, or as tips for services rendered.

Every year, funding the bureaucracy was increasingly done through local and foreign borrowings. Since the mechanics and dynamics of such funding were not transparent, the civil service personnel were not aware of the economic and fiscal implications, but rather viewed such flow of funds as part of overall improvement in the economy. The various technological and management innovations adopted by the bureaucracy added to the false sense of progress and development as perceived by the employees.

The continuous flow of developmental inputs into the administrative machinery of government and the adoption of new techniques in bureaucratic processes altogether gave a convincing semblance of overall development.

Then the election of 1969 came and Marcos won his second bid for the presidency.

Marcos Regime II: Martial Law and the New Society, 1969-1981

There is persistent rumor that the victory of President Marcos in 1969 was won with "goons, guns, and gold in the dirtiest election ever held in the Philippines." Marcos overspent an enormous sum of public and private funds which together with the expenditures by the opposition, effected an oversupply of money in circulation and consequently damaged the Philippine economy. Promising not to devalue the peso during his campaign sorties, Marcos relied on the assurances of the World Bank (WB)-International Monetary Fund (IMF) for recourse without devaluation. However, when Marcos asked for standby loans to cover the fast mounting trade deficits and debt servicing, the WB-IMF assurance was set aside for stiff unconditional devaluation.

President Marcos then "floated" the peso from ₱3.90 to ₱6.85 to \$1, a devaluation of about 60% which caused a drop in real wages of around 50% (World Bank 1980). He was also faced with dried-up foreign exchange reserves and a

balance of payment deficit amounting to a critical level of \$136.5 millions (Payer 1975: 56).

The economic crisis started by the decontrol debacle of the Macapagal era continued and worsened under Marcos. The "floating rate" decreased the purchasing power of the peso affecting every one including the civil service personnel. Employees' clamor for increases in salaries were not met; instead, a freeze on new hires, filling in of vacant positions, and selective promotions was instituted. Government services decreased especially in social services as budget allocations were correspondingly slashed. Less and less funds were earmarked for human resources (human services and increases in salaries) but more on physical and monumental infrastructures which were visible and hence possessed political value.

Marcos' management of the economy saw an alternating pattern of increases in foreign debts, devaluations, increases in costs of repaying loans, increasing economic difficulties and poverty among the people, and the move toward the "debt trap."

To attract foreign capital investments, incentive laws for foreign investors were provided in 1967 and 1970⁷ to the detriment of Filipino entrepreneurs. The measures did not however result in any considerable increase in foreign investments, because the foreign firms were financing new investments mainly from local profits or borrowings from domestic sources (Espiritu 1978).

More devaluations and continued free trade and decontrol brought serious dislocations to the Philippine economy. The political choices were narrowed down to the alternatives advanced by the United States and the WB-IMF, which choices were more advantageous to the U.S. than the Philippines.

In the meantime, a joint Executive-Legislative Reorganization Commission was established to draft an Integrated Reorganization Plan designed to implement reforms in the bureaucracy to bring about economy, efficiency, and responsiveness.

In addition, the Constitutional Convention of 1970 was called to rewrite the basic law of the land. Nationalist measures under discussion tended to restrict the formal conditions of American access to Philippine resources and markets and called for changes to restrict foreign investments (Paterno 1973: 27). Members of the Constitutional Convention of 1970 were bribed, intimidated and coerced to force them to (1) approve a proposal to change the existing presidential form of government to the parliamentary system; and (2) defeat the "ban Marcos" proposal which would have disqualified President Marcos, his spouse, and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree from seeking the post of Prime Minister under the new Charter (Mijares 1976: 137).

Some critics conjectured that Marcos intended to be legally installed as a dictator for life and was preparing his son Bongbong as his hereditary successor, with First Lady Imelda Marcos as a standby heir and queen regent for Bongbong (Mijares 1976: 96). The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station in Manila started to analyze signals in 1972 which apparently supported the Mijares claim. Imelda Marcos herself provided the signals from what she was saying to her Blue Ladies, which the CIA picked up. "This country really needs my husband, don't you think? My husband really should stay on. Don't you agree?" (Bonner 1987: 93).

The mounting economic deterioration and the increasing political uncertainty and instability affecting the investment climate for foreign capital were aggravated by street demonstrations. Peasants, students, and workers staged mass rallies; dissent came from representatives of national industrialists; and increasing confrontation between the government and its massed opponents in the "parliaments of the streets" led to the deterioration of peace and order.

The red scare had been raised. The Marcos government said that the Communists were well-organized, well-armed, and violent (Bonner 1987: 95). A series of terrorist bombings seemed to prove the claim. The Arca building, Filipinas Orient Airway's office, and a Philippine Trust Company branch were the victims in March, April, and June 1972. Then in July there were separate incidents—explosions in the Phil-American Life Building, apparently aimed at the Far East Bank and Trust Company, the American Express and the discovery of a bomb in the Senate's publications office (Bonner 1987). The New People's Army (NPA) and communist forces were blamed by the administration for acts of violence and terrorism (Mijares 1976: 56-57). Military forces were increased considerably to meet the alleged communist threat.

The grenade bombing of the Liberal Party rally at Plaza Miranda on 21 August 1971 caused the suspension of the *writ of habeas corpus*. The public disorders were aggravated by increasing unemployment and labor strikes. The untimely discovery and disclosure of "OPLAN SAGITTARIUS" by Senator Ninoy Aquino hastened the declaration of Martial Law on 21 September 1972.

Looking back in time, a close confidant observed that President Marcos had no plans to limit himself to the constitutional mandate of two terms, but instead had prepared himself for the presidency for life (Mijares 1976: 133). His plans called for his reelection in 1969 "at all costs," the declaration of martial law at least a year before the expiration of his second term, control of the military establishment, the Supreme Court, and local governments, as well as control of economic and financial power by positioning cronies in sensitive top posts of government financial and lending institutions and in revenue-collecting agencies (Mijares 1976: 134-135).

A meeting was held with Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile and a handful of his most trusted military commanders (Bonner 1987). A decision to declare martial law was reached. But Marcos had to set the stage for the declaration (Bonner 1987: 97).

Martial Law and Changes in the Bureaucracy. Having consolidated the military and now assured of its support, Marcos assumed all powers of the State and placed all government agencies and instrumentalities under his personal control, including the Judiciary (Proclamation No. 1081, 21 September 1972). He issued General Order No. 1 (11 September 1972) in which he ordered the Judiciary to continue to function in accordance with its present organization and personnel and to adjudicate cases in accordance with existing criminal and civil laws except those pertaining to his decrees and general orders arising out of Proclamation No. 1081 (Mijares 1976: 95).

Marcos suspended and later padlocked the Legislature and granted legislative powers unto himself through his decree-making powers (Mijares 1976: 108).

The Supreme Court, the last bastion of justice in the country, was allegedly blackmailed by Marcos with the threat of a revolutionary government if it ever rebuffed the President on questions of constitutionality brought to its attention (Mijares 1976: 107).

The dealings of Marcos with his Cabinet after martial law were described by Mijares:

He retained all members of his Cabinet, and in cases where he had quarrelling officials in one department, he split the said department to accommodate and/or calm down the protagonists. Mr. Marcos cannot afford to dismiss or displease members of his Cabinet, most of whom are either incompetent or aging, without running the risk of being exposed by them on numerous anomalous government transactions that plague the martial law regime and the previous constitutional Marcos I and II administration (Mijares 1976: 105-106).

With the imposition of martial law, President Marcos shook the entire civil service, including members of the Judiciary and local governments, by requiring them under Letters of Instruction Nos. 11 and 14 to submit their courtesy resignations. The security of tenure principle in the civil service lost its meaning, since anybody who was deemed "notoriously undesirable" could be notified that his resignation was accepted (Mijares 1976: 106-107).

He also decreed that provincial governors, city and municipal mayors, provincial board members and municipal councilors were to be appointed by him when their terms expired in 1975 (Mijares 1976: 106).

Two days after declaring martial law, President Marcos implemented the Integrated Reorganization Plan. The Plan, he claimed, provided for the restructuring and modernization of the bureaucracy to make it attuned to the needs of the New Society and the new political order.

A purge of civil servants aimed at weeding out the "notoriously undesirable, the misfits, and incompetents" from the government service was also undertaken. The September purge created fear among the civil service personnel because the constitutional provisions giving them tenure and protecting them from removal from the service except "for cause." At the time of the ratification of the new Constitution when the Interim National Assembly was not yet in session, the fate of all officials and employees in all levels of government, elective and appointive, rested on the President. Marcos could let them continue in office, or replace them, or he could simply declare the positions vacant.

The purge was admittedly done in haste. Many of those in the Malacañang purge list were later revealed to have died, retired, or transferred to the private sector; some managed to continue in office while others were reinstated after having cleared themselves. There was a feeling among the civil servants that if the due process requirement was observed, less injustice would have been committed. Interviews with civil service personnel indicated that many of them agreed with the removal from service of personnel proven to be notoriously undesirable, but only after due process.

To stifle resistance to martial law, Marcos clamped in jails or in military camps the opposition leaders, media men, and the leaders of the parliament of the streets (Mijares 1976: 61).

The Filipino people in general appeared to have accepted the imposition of martial law as an alternative to the worsening conditions of unsolved bombings, riots, ambushes, graft and corruption, inefficiency and chicanery. The climate of fear and repression created by Proclamation No. 1081 drove the people into a passive attitude toward martial law (Mijares 1976: 61-62).

The Military and Technocrats in the Marcos Bureaucracy. On the pretext of combatting the growing communist threat, and later to backstop his martial law regime, the military forces were increased from the pre-martial law complement of 65,000 to 270,000 by the end of 1976 (Mijares 1976: 107). Recruitment in the armed forces was concentrated on the Ilocanos, who constituted 70 percent of the manpower, drawing such comment as "the Ilocanization of the armed forces." That was perceived as a means to ensure loyalty to "Apo Ferdie,"⁸ an Ilocano (Mijares 1976: 218).

The members of the armed forces were well taken care of by the martial law administration. Their salaries and allowances were increased by 150%, in

contrast to the ₱50.00 cost of living allowance per month grudgingly given to civil servants who received monthly salaries of less than ₱600.00 (Mijares 1976: 107). Major slashes in the government budget were made at the cost of human services, thus directly affecting the poor, but not at the cost of the military.

Military officers were appointed to top positions in the bureaucracy where they acted as the "eyes and ears" of the regime. Oftentimes, they were placed in political and career positions, causing demoralization among the career service officers whose career paths were adversely affected.

Military abuses such as violations of human rights, smuggling, protection rackets, maintenance of gambling dens, and *tong* collections were tolerated (Mijares 1976: 105). The martial law regime accommodated and shared some of its powers with the military.

The recruitment of technocrats to spearhead national development activities accelerated with martial law. With absolute powers in his hands, Marcos was free to do anything he wanted without the Congress, the press, or adverse public opinion thwarting his desires. One of his policies was deficit financing wherein foreign borrowings played a crucial role in "development finance." The role of the technocrats in this regard was critical: they were the ones who came up with development plans and the strategies to operationalize them.

The technocrats increasingly enjoyed more than just technocratic power. They wielded immense political power in the guise of technical decisions. As observed by Carol Guina: "Partly because their authority rested on the expertise they possessed and more importantly because they were bound by loyalty to the ruling political master, they soon began to wield enormous power in the political scene" (Guina 1986: 261).

Marcosian Moral Regeneration and the New Society. With martial law, Marcos advanced his vision of a New Society (Marcos 1973) and condemned the sick old society as composed of the "social and political elite manipulating a precarious democracy of patronage, privilege, and personal aggrandizement" (Marcos 1973: 36). His vision of a new society marked the "attempt at a new start at moral and political regeneration" (Dubsky 1974: 128).

As Dubsky saw it:

... the New Society projects itself as standing for the reformation of the whole fabric of Philippine life. Its leaders claimed to advocate radical reforms, not merely in the sense of aiming at correcting the old social evils, but more importantly, in the sense of aiming at restructuring the various aspects of Filipino life, such as the political, social, and economic. One of the fundamental reforms, directed toward society and the bureaucracy, was moral or spiritual reformation or regeneration (Dubsky 1974: 129).

The New Society called for the institutionalization of social conduct based on the following ideological parameters: nationalism, democracy, a multifaceted and multidisciplinary approach to social life, social and economic development, cultural development, and a pragmatic and technocratic nature of the ideological approach (Dubsky 1974: 129-131).

To realize social and economic democracy, Marcos instituted the following changes:

- 1) calling of a Constitutional Convention to demonstrate that the radical changes envisioned by his New Society could be achieved by constitutional means;
- 2) reorganization of the government: reforms in the civil service, in the judiciary, and land and electoral reforms;
- 3) mobilization of people's participation through the modernized barangays in the form of citizens' assemblies to activate participatory democracy; and
- 4) reorientation of political authority.

Marcos was obsessed with legality and history. Not content with his moral and social conduct prescriptions which he elaborated in his vision of the New Society, he wanted the conduct of public officers and employees prescribed in the Constitution of 1973.

As guidelines for the conduct of government officials and employees, the relevant stipulations were:

- 1) In matters of employment, the Constitution of 1973 declared that full employment and equality in employment is the right of every citizen;
- 2) The Constitution forbade civil servants from indulging in certain practices advantageous to themselves in taxation, double compensation, and possible bribery;
- 3) It prohibited the appointment of elective officials to any office during their terms of office;
- 4) It prohibited appointment or reappointment of defeated or lameduck candidates in any office having to do with government;
- 5) It created the *Sandiganbayan* to deal with offenses committed by public officers or corporations;

- 6) It created the *Tanodbayan* to investigate complaints against public or government officers and to take legal action; and
- 7) It made graft and corruption in public office a ground for impeachment.

To attain the goals of the New Society, the martial law regime authorized a massive reorientation program in the civil service to cover all instrumentalities of government in preparation for the advent of the New Society (Marcos 1973). As the concept and strategies for the New Society penetrated the civil service, the public personnel appreciated the PLEDGES⁹ and believed in the redeeming value of the reorientation program.

The initial values to be learned were: discipline, courtesy, and gentlemanly conduct in the public service in lieu of the arrogant bureaucratic behavior of pre-martial law days. "Public office as a public trust" was to be strengthened as another value and made a norm. Graft and corruption should be done away with, as also inefficiency among government employees.

Ethical and moral qualities and values started to be internalized, and initial success was discerned. The purge convinced the cynics in the public service of the sincerity and decisiveness of the New Society to change for the better.

The merit system was once more upheld when compared to the Marcos Regime I. Political patronage was held at bay since there were no congressmen and senators to ply the trade, and Marcos was keeping his nose clean.

The attention given to the reorganization of the civil service supported the sincerity of the efforts of the New Society to turn over a new leaf. President Marcos himself was condescending when he recognized that the government was overstaffed. He said:

... weakness of the rank and file are not so much rooted in individual incompetence or corruption but perhaps in the very system of recruitment, of personal evaluation, and of securing jobs that the civil service has created in the past (Marcos 1975: 9).

He contended that graft and corruption could not be arrested by even the "most punitive measure we may decree" since it was rooted in social and economic conditions. It would probably disappear in proportion to the development of our political culture and the development of our economy (Marcos 1975: 9).

In defense of the Marcosian democracy component of the New Society, Marcos spoke about the political culture which gives the democratic system the viability that social and political institutions show. It is political culture in his view that gives a central and crucial role to the politician.

It is fashionable to speak of *politics* as a *disease* in our national life, but we must face the fact that majority of our people depend on the government for their well-being, which inevitably means that they are dependent on political connections to get their due from an oftentimes leisurely and corrupt bureaucracy. The political culture, therefore, of the majority, permits and encourages the use of political influence: thus the criterion of accessibility as the measure of political success. That is the underlying meaning of the Rand finding that 'politicians perceive the wishes of their constituents accurately and try to fulfill them' (Marcos 1971: 45-46).

Administrative Culture Under Martial Law. The civil service played a crucial role in the initial success of martial law. During its early years the merit system was observed and political patronage was minimized. But this did not last long. Rampant violations of the merit system eventually undermined the morale of the civil servants.

1. The "Smiling" Martial Law

The unexpected proclamation of martial law evoked fear and surprise in the civil service. After the initial "shock," the government employees pragmatically recovered and went back to work as usual to serve the same master but under a new political order.

Immediately after the declaration of martial law, government employees were obliged to cultivate the virtues of honesty, eradicate graft and corruption and bureaucratic arrogance, show courtesy to the public, and behave with discipline. Public employees responded positively.

Public employees were assured of the New Society's adherence to liberal and democratic traditions as safeguards against control and compatible with human freedom. The regime further reassured the employees that the use of authoritarian methods and compulsion was only temporary, and that normal and democratic operations would be restored once the conditions in the country returned to "normal" (Dubsky 1974: 141).

The democratic display of the freedom of speech and of assembly before martial law and its aftermath of riots and violent rallies were still fresh in the minds of the public employees. The comparative "peace" prevailing as they went to and returned from work was a welcome respite from the unruly street demonstrations they had experienced before. Majority of them were spared the trauma of the September purge, although they shared the general feeling of anxiety and insecurity among employees. They could not but agree with the desire of Marcos to build the New Society on the foundations of moral and ethical uprightness, equal justice, and clean government with a social conscience. The initial fears and confusion in the civil service and among its employees were dissipating. They felt they could live with the "smiling" martial law.

For their part, the martial law administrators were serious in trying to gain the confidence of the people and of the bureaucracy. The early stage of martial law saw the application of the merit system and the decrease of political patronage. Graft and corruption also diminished, and polite, humane public services were given to the clientele.

The special treatment being accorded the military did not escape the attention of the civil service personnel — 150 percent increases in their salaries and cost of living allowance, housing and commissary privileges given them as incentives, risk pay, and ubiquitous presence and prestige. They also noted the increasing budgetary allocations earmarked for the military. The public service employees meanwhile adopted an attitude of "wait and see."

2. *The "Conjugal Dictatorship"*

It did not take long before martial law was unmasked for what it really was. The New Society revealed itself to be worse than the Old Society. It was a society characterized by the same "patronage, privilege, and personal aggrandizement" with the added elements of plunder, political and moral turpitude and bankruptcy, greed, oppression, graft and corruption, and "kleptocracy," to mention a few (Mijares 1976: 210; Aquino 1987).

According to Mijares, Imelda Marcos could not wait to share power (Mijares 1976: 128). The "conjugal dictatorship" went on a rampage. Drunk with absolute power, it did not spare anyone or anything in its path. The old oligarchs, local and foreign industrialists, foreign creditors and aid donors, the bureaucracy, and even the poor became victims of the dictatorship's greed (Mijares 1976: 187-210).

Critics averred that no institution was sacred, and nothing was beyond the clutches of the dictatorship. The bureaucracy, particularly the Supreme Court and the Civil Service, were manipulated and became appropriate tools for conjugal plunder. The Constitutional Convention was subjected to the "payola" scandal¹⁰ to get favorable terms in the change of form of government from presidential to parliamentary, and to defeat the proposal to ban Marcos from seeking the post of Prime Minister under the new Charter in order to ensure thereby the perpetuity in power of the Marcos dynasty (Mijares 1976: 137). Bonner (1987: 127) wrote that when the Constitutional Convention began considering provisions that might either restrict his powers or expand them, Marcos resorted to "bribery and intimidation."

The Supreme Court became the legitimizing means for the martial law regime (Mijares 1976: 60); while Marcos' hold on the Civil Service Commission tightened when he appointed as Chairman of the Commission his Chief Presidential Executive Assistant and one of the persons closest to him.

No one in the appointive and elective posts in government could claim security of tenure. Presidential decrees could change the rules of the game anytime. Public officials and employees could be dismissed without due process. The bureaucracy, including the military organization, was cowed and it kowtowed to the "conjugal dictators."

The bureaucracy alternately played the roles of collaborators, beneficiaries or victims of the conjugal dictatorship (Guina 1986: 261-262; Cariño 1987). They were used as pawns in the administrative and political chessboard during martial law.

3. Behavior of Civil Servants Under the Conjugal Dictators

Following the imposition of martial law, the civil servants behaved with fear and obedience. They faithfully complied with the martial law orders for polite public and social conduct. They treated the clients in very gentlemanly manner, displayed utmost discipline (e.g., queuing, first come, first served, etc.), and were very professional in their manner of dressing, discourse, and behavior.

Many offices, convinced that the martial law regime was determined to reform social conduct under the New Society, applied the merit system rigorously, and avoided political patronage for fear of displeasing the martial law regime.

Positive official conduct was also seen among employees coming on time for work, working longer hours, earning their salaries, loitering no longer or using official time for personal errands, as they did in the past.

Acts of graft and corruption diminished; employees behaved as to avoid being branded notoriously undesirable, incompetent, or negligent.

Reorientation training programs conducted in government offices started to condition attitudes and internalize behavior along the lines of the model envisioned in the New Society. It was a popular thought that the government and its officials and employees were all on the right track for positive behavioral change.

After some time, however, employees realized glaring contradictions between policy pronouncements and administrative practices as the ugly head of political patronage started showing itself. Violations of the merit system were exposed and the restructuring of the bureaucracy through the implementation of the Integrated Reorganization Plan led to confusion as the actual changes deviated from the plan. Splitting of departments was common practice in order to accommodate political allies. Appointments of military officers to civilian career positions were made, and career positions were filled up with political appointees.

Public employees and officials well on the way to professional and ethical conduct and behavior started rethinking what martial law was all about.

Then, Imelda Marcos, Kokoy Romualdez, and the Marcos and Romualdez relatives, later joined by the cronies and military top brass became very active in government affairs (Mijares 1976: 187-188). Public employees felt that developments in government were starting to erode the initial gains of good public service, and that all the brouhaha about moral reformation and the goals of the New Society were only lip-service.

As the good practices and behavior had not been internalized, public officials and employees were observed to backslide to their "bad" habits. In no time bureaucratic arrogance, public disservice, and abuse of clients became common behavior.

Recruitment and promotions in the civil service became rewards for personal loyalty, unwavering obedience, or complete subservience to the President or the First Lady. The merit system and its requirements were imposed upon those who did not have political clout, connection, or backing; or for filling up ordinary posts, assignments, and personnel items. Political patronage gained more value as currency for recruitment and promotion especially when it became standard practice for high officials to comply with Marcos' demand for complete personal loyalty as passport for rewards. Under these conditions, the general run of employees who must comply with the requirements imposed by the merit system for employment in the martial law bureaucracy took such malpractices with a grain of salt, if only to keep their positions.

Furthermore, the conditions of work in various government entities were not comparable. Those in line ministries compared miserably with those in government corporations and affluent departments. Government corporations in general, and selected departments like tourism, human settlements, revenue-collecting agencies, licensing and regulatory entities, and those blessed by the First Couple, saw rampant by-passing of civil service rules and laws, employment of large percentage of contractual and casual employees with very high salaries, lavish fringe benefits, and fat representation and transportation allowances. The duality in treatment of government offices resulted into extreme demoralization among public employees.

Retrenchment in government, each time there was devaluation, usually took its toll on public officials and employees. The normal effect on government operation was less allocation for personnel which in turn led to the freeze policy on new hires, promotion, and filling of vacant positions. Therefore, there was no career movement among the employees. Second, salaries remained at the same level, but with less purchasing power so that employees were able to buy less of their basic needs. As a result, there was lower employee morale and lesser

productivity. Retrenchment was adopted and implemented many times in the civil service for the duration of martial law.

When the public employees needed to be pacified, five percent to ten percent across-the-board salary increases were given. But they were a pittance compared to the 300 percent - 600 percent inflation gap that the increases intended to close. When such salary increases were given, the disparities between salaries in government corporations and in line departments became more pronounced, as some remarks showed: "The salaries of janitors in big government corporations are very much higher than my salary as a division chief," or, "the salary increase will just go to the deductions for GSIS premiums, Medicare, and Pag-ibig and bring me to a higher income tax bracket," or, *nakakainsulto lamang ito* (this can be very insulting).¹¹

Since retrenchment closed the normal career paths for the civil servants, the two avenues remaining for career progression were political patronage and graft and corruption. Under martial law, these became "standards" via political patronage. Several techniques were used: favoritism, nepotism, *compadrazgo*, cronyism, *utang-na-loob*, *palakasan*, *sip-sip*, or *bilihan*.¹² The avenues were not alien to the Filipino culture and values, especially when looking at the familial connections one had in the government network.

The other way was graft and corruption. The absolute power enjoyed by the "conjugal dictatorship" provided no clear delineation of what was corrupt and what was not. Considering that graft and corruption were practiced at the top, it was easier to carry the practice down at the various levels of the hierarchy. Civil servants followed on the heels of "the-leadership-by-example" of top political and bureaucratic leaders toward graft and corrupt practices where the promises were abundant and the punishments negligible.

During the martial law era, graft and corruption were allegedly practiced at the high echelons of both civilian and military organizations. Such negative practices were tolerated by both the ruling power and by the superior officers in the military. Public officials were on the take with the easy rationalization: that in case they got caught or they fell out of grace, then they had something to fall back on (Mijares 1976: 206, 209).

The standard operating procedures in government offices and the system of graft and corruption were parallel systems. Political corruption was generally practiced, with many public officials and employees using their offices for private gains. Political corruption was common in agencies performing licensing or regulatory functions, in revenue-collecting offices, and in entities with approval powers. However, it did not exist where papers were routed for information or notation purposes only, and not for official approval.

Public accountability was a forgotten thing. Accountability, if ever it existed, was to the conjugal dictators, their relatives, cronies, and the military who were co-administrators of martial law. It covered political appointees and even career executives, but also for elective positions whose incumbents owed their election to the Marcoses or their political machinery.

The appointment of the Marcoses and Romualdezes to sensitive and important positions in government grossly violated existing laws on nepotism, favoritism, and graft. Appointment was made to juicy positions where they could dip their fingers into the public largesse, and to administrative bodies dealing with foreign loans, donations, contracts, and monetary flows. Although the laws regulating these activities were many, the agencies responsible for enforcing them were inutile. Individuals subjected to the force of such laws claimed they had been superseded by presidential decrees, or they declared themselves above the law.

Career officials, by operation of law, practice, and tradition should be spared from political patronage. However, when Marcos extended to them presidential appointments in the Career Executive Service (CES), their political neutrality became tainted. This made stability and continuity of the civil service difficult, if not impossible to maintain, in the event of political change. With the elective, appointive, and career personnel in the government system under the presidential power of appointment, the control of the bureaucracy by President Marcos became complete.

Appointments to the top and higher levels of the public service could therefore be done only with the political blessings of the dictator or his consort. Even the appointment of technocrats to government posts was based not only on technical competence but made also with a stern demand for personal loyalty to the Chief Executive which later became the basis for reward in the public service (Guina 1986: 261).

There was general demoralization among government employees because of the disparities in salaries and working conditions between and among line departments and government corporations, and between and among favored agencies and those which were not. Another source of demoralization was the unfairness in employment benefits enjoyed by the different groups mentioned above. Likewise, there was favoritism and nepotism as well as political patronage resulting in uneven rewards. Other demotivating factors were the unchecked graft and corrupt practices particularly in high places. The feeling of frustration and helplessness among public employees was manifested in various forms of employee demotivation, low productivity, absenteeism, tardiness, and *palusot*.¹³

As a consequence of the economic plunder perpetrated by martial law, economic conditions worsened to an alarming state at the end of the martial law regime. Mounting debt obligations resulted in repeated devaluations, bankruptcy

of domestic business, wage freezes, new taxes, unemployment, low or no incomes, high prices of commodities and poverty among an increasing number of the Filipino people.

The NPA-Communist threat continued to aggravate despite heavy military spending, and peace and order conditions were precarious. Dissent against mishandling and mismanagement of government affairs under the martial law regime mounted.

On one hand, protests labeled "Hers" were against the lavish and extravagant lifestyle of Imelda, her undevelopmental and monumental projects, expensive "official" visits abroad, and excessive parties in the midst of dire poverty among Filipinos. On the other hand, total disenchantment with Marcos and his New Society, crony capitalism, sugar and coconut monopolies, human rights violations, military abuses, and political and economic excesses were labeled "His."

At the same time, there was increasing pressure from the United States against the continuance of the dictatorial rule because the American government found it extremely difficult to justify continued economic and military aid to the Marcos government. In view of the increasing unpopularity of the "conjugal dictators," Marcos prepared the way to return to "democracy."

First, the Constitution of 1973 had to be amended. A plebiscite was conducted on 7 April 1981 for this purpose. The Constitutional amendment provided for a return to the presidential system of the 1935 Constitution, to replace the parliamentary system Marcos had instituted in 1973.

The presidential system ushered in by the 1981 amendment provided for a stronger president than that of 1935, with a term of six years, and the right of unlimited succession. It gave the president the power to name his successor, as well as to dissolve the Legislature. There was no vice-president so as not to create a competitor for Marcos (Bonner 1987).

Second, a presidential election was undertaken in June 1981. The opposition did not participate in the charade knowing fully that the election would be a sham.

Finally, on 17 January 1981, Marcos "lifted Martial Law to return to democracy."

Marcos Regime III: The New Republic, 1981-1986

The state of administrative culture which took shape and jelled during the martial law years did not improve even after the "return to democracy." Charges

were made that the lifting of martial law was only a paper lifting. Amendment No. 6 allowed the President to retain the tremendous powers he had accumulated during the martial law regime, as well as the martial law administrative infrastructures he had built.

Economic conditions continued to deteriorate; unemployment increased, low or no income among Filipino families caused more poverty, high prices made the meeting of basic needs more difficult, and government social and human services showed no improvements.

Deteriorating peace and order conditions aggravated economic and social conditions. NPA-Communist activities took place in town and urban centers, and the military abuses and violations of human rights remained unmitigated.

Later complaints against Marcos and his government after the lifting of martial law were focused on succession issues, electoral reforms, crony capitalism, vast power of the military, and the call for an early election (Stauffer 1986: 188).

The worst came with the assassination of Senator Ninoy Aquino at the tarmac of the Manila International Airport on 21 August 1983. The event mobilized Filipinos; hundreds of thousands marched in the streets to mourn his death and simultaneously to protest against Marcos' rule (Bonner 1987: 339).

The credibility gap which Marcos developed over the span of almost 16 years burst wide open beyond repair. The pent-up feelings that Filipinos in general had against the Marcoses and their minions turned into contempt. Majority of the people felt there was no liberation from the evil grip of the dictator.

Done in broad daylight with full local and foreign media coverage and seen by the Filipino people on television, the assassination of Senator Aquino upon his arrival from abroad, gave them a feeling of helplessness. The loss of hope among the Filipino people, especially the common *tao*¹⁴ regarding the Marcos regime was worse compounded by the realization that even a prominent senator of the country could not be spared from the excesses of the Marcos regime. Some Filipinos, upon learning that Marcos was reportedly dying, even openly wished him dead.

Beholding the sight of the fallen Senator, still dressed in the bush jacket he died in, with dried blood splattered over his face, Filipinos suspected the hand of Marcos behind the assassination.

Anger and condemnation spread like wildfire in homes and government offices. Public officials and employees exchanged notes about the event, their hearts gripped in fear yet seeking solace in the numerous "Ninoy jokes" which lampooned the Marcoses and the assassination to relieve tension.

The incredible turnout of mourners during the funeral procession was unsurpassed; even that for President Magsaysay could not equal it.

When the emotions had died down and the people had regained their composure, political instability deepened and the suspicion persisted that the top political leadership and the military were behind the heinous crime.

Politically, the Marcos regime became more repressive. There was increased corruption in high places and wanton denial of basic human rights to a greater number of people. Rumors of Marcos' failing health brought uncertainty in political succession (Mijares 1976).

The political crisis led to massive capital flight of both foreign and local investors for fear that the Philippines might yet become another Nicaragua or Vietnam. The private sector suffered a crisis in letters of credit, experienced stagnant domestic market, and high cost of money due to devaluation and tight credit. The government cut down its social services, abolished the various subsidies given to local borrowers, and kept its exploitative low wages in both public and private sectors, and instituted measures to stem the hemorrhagic flow of capital to other lands.

The last straw was provided by the snap elections of 7 February 1986. The "dirtiest election of 1969" which was won with "goons, guns, and gold" paled in comparison. The Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines called the fraud "unparalleled." The bishops condemned the "systematic disenfranchisement of voters..., widespread and massive votebuying ..., deliberate tampering with the election returns and ..., intimidation, harassment, terrorism, and murder." Then it announced pointedly: "According to moral principles, a government that assumes or retains power through fraudulent means has no moral basis" (Bonner 1987: 425).

It was open suspicion that the Central Bank vault was ripped open to finance the campaign and massive vote buying. Public officials and employees were used to campaign for Marcos or to provide the crowds at his rallies and meetings through the *hakot*¹⁵ system, while Air Force helicopters and Navy ships ferried administration candidates and campaigners to the rallies. Likewise, appropriations of ministries and governmental agencies at all hierarchical levels funded regional and local campaign materials and the political machinery. The resources made available to *Kilusang Bagong Lipunan* (KBL), the Marcos political party, seemed unlimited. A \$700 million outflow was registered in the balance sheet of the Central Bank during the campaign period!

The wanton violation of civil service neutrality and of the separation of public and private resources which Marcos and the KBL did with impunity, jolted the public employees as they came face to face with the fact that they had been victims of the Marcos regime for almost twenty years. They remembered that

since 1965, the bureaucracy was always the first to suffer austerity measures adopted by the administration, viz., exploitative low salaries and wages; freeze on recruitment, promotion, and fringe benefits; stoppage of Government Service Insurance System housing loans in order to fund the huge expenses of the Manila Hotel and the Philippine Airlines for the personal enjoyment of Imelda Marcos and friends. Also, there were several instances of cut-downs on social services for the underpaid government employees; disparities in pay and incentives between government corporations and agencies that enjoyed the blessings of the First Couple and those not within their graces; and between the civil and military services. Likewise, they regarded with disdain the alleged all-expenses government-paid royalty-styled wedding of Irene, one of the Marcos daughters.

They also vividly remembered how they were exploited in the various legitimizing political exercises: elections, plebiscites and referenda, either with the sword of Damocles hanging over their heads or false promises dangled to make them dance to the Marcos tune or else! They felt miserable when they remembered how for twenty years it was poverty, sufferings, and deprivation for them and the rest of the Filipino people, while life for the Marcoses in Malacañang was a continuing lavish display of luxury and abundant feastings shared with their cronies and political friends.

Many officials and employees who remained honest, neutral and loyal to the people also remembered how their lives were tarnished when they were instructed to steal from the public coffers or when they allowed the conjugal dictators to borrow their respectability to lend the Marcoses "credibility," and to deodorize their foul deeds.

Moreover, they remembered how, in their weakness, they "waltzed with the dictator" (Bonner 1987) and tolerated him. The snap presidential elections brought their tolerance to an end and they decided, "no more."

In a cleansing gesture to vindicate themselves, the public employees voted for Cory Aquino. But no, they could not claim their victory yet: Marcos had himself declared winner by his *Batasang Pambansa* (Legislature) and took his oath of office in Malacañang as the Seventh President of the Philippines. Marcos had rigged the elections and had stolen the presidency from Cory Aquino and the Filipino people.

It was almost two weeks later, when the military, the religious, the business community, and hordes of Filipinos finally wrestled power and ousted the dictator through "people power."¹⁶ Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, their children, and allies were last seen by the Filipino people on television, fleeing to Hawaii. "It's all over!" reported the *Philippine Daily Inquirer* in its headline.

Democracy had been restored in the country as the whole world watched and cheered (Bonner 1987: 435).

Administrative Culture During Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy: The Aquino Administration

After the euphoria of the February Revolution died down, the Filipino people and the newly installed Aquino government were shocked by the havoc left behind by the Marcos dictatorship. Economically, a \$28 billion foreign debt, a plundered economy, and widespread poverty confronted the nation. Politically, important political institutions had been perverted to legalize and perpetuate Marcos in power. The 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary and Supreme Court, the Commission on Elections, and the *Batasang Pambansa*, subservient rubber stamps that they had become, all together lent to the continuance of the Marcos dictatorship and authoritarian rule. Administratively, the new government inherited a "battered bureaucracy" and a demoralized civil service characterized by inefficiency, graft and corruption, and low performance. A divided military and mounting insurgency problems completed the legacy.

The ascendancy to power of the Aquino government was attributed to "People Power," a joint military-civilian effort which ousted the dictator. The impact of Corazon Aquino's victory in the 1986 snap elections by an overwhelming majority of votes, was lost to the people's jubilation over Marcos' fleeing the country to Hawaii (Tancangco 1986).

In its desire to have a fresh start, and as part of the process of power consolidation and political normalization, the new Aquino government declared itself "revolutionary" in nature, abolished the *Batasang Pambansa*, and nullified the 1973 Constitution. It then instituted the "Freedom Constitution" through Proclamation No. 3 on 25 March 1986. To dismantle the nationwide political machinery of Marcos at the local levels, it removed all incumbent local government officials in provinces, cities, and municipalities and replaced them with political appointees as officers-in-charge (OICs).

The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) was organized through Executive Order No. 1, which was signed into law on 28 February 1986, to recover the ill-gotten wealth that the Marcoses, their relatives, political friends and cronies plundered from the moribund treasury. To cleanse the government of the Marcos "diseases", particularly inefficiency and callousness and graft and corruption, the Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization was constituted through Executive Order No. 5, a law signed on 12 March 1986. Its main objective was to streamline the political structure and to reduce the bureaucracy to appropriate size necessary to make it more responsive to public service.

The Freedom Constitution and the Bureaucracy

The Freedom Constitution empowered President Aquino to reorganize the government. Massive changes in the bureaucracy were undertaken, notably the reorganization of government agencies, the de-Marcosification of the bureaucracy, or the purge of corrupt and inefficient employees, and institution of administrative reforms to bring about simplicity, economy, efficiency, and transparency in government operations.

The hardest blow delivered by the Freedom Constitution against the civil service and its personnel was the loss of the right to tenure. Article III, Section 2 of the Freedom Constitution provided:

All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from 25 February 1986.

This provision took away from the public employees the long-cherished right of security of tenure.

Similar to what happened during the purges of 1973 and 1975 under martial law, government employees who had permanent appointment and were classified in the career service could not invoke the right of security of tenure. Again, the first to get the axe were the casual and contractual workers in government whose layoff effected a 25 percent savings in salary payments during the first quarter of 1980 when a P5 billion deficit attributed to Marcos/KBL excessive election spending was incurred (Montejo 1986).

Courtesy resignations of political appointees and career officials and employees alike were demanded by the newly-appointed Cabinet members. For instance, Minister Ramon Mitra, Jr. of Agriculture required all Marcos-appointed officials in his department and 26 bureaus and agencies under it to tender their resignations immediately. Minister Ernesto Maceda of Natural Resources also issued a similar order in his ministry. Local Government Minister Aquilino Pimentel Jr. replaced all local government executives with officers-in-charge (OICs). In other government agencies, specifically the Manila International Airport (later renamed the Ninoy Aquino International Airport) and Bureau of Customs, volunteers from human rights and cause-oriented organizations were brought in to occupy top positions.

The Aquino administration viewed the civil service it had inherited not as a permanent institution of government which ensures stability and continuity of services and operations, but as a legacy and an extension of the discredited Marcos authoritarian rule (Cariño 1986). It was convinced therefore of the need

not only to reorganize it, but also to purge it as well and to replace all those who had been identified with the past regime with their own people, supporters, and "lackeys," who would be more sympathetic to their programs (Egunsola 1987: 3).

The purges, resignations, and OIC designations during the first few months of the revolutionary government were seen positively by many citizens as moves to dismantle the vestiges of authoritarian rule and weed out well-known Marcos loyalists from the bureaucracy. Even the civil servants were happy to see that the first resignations were from persons who had openly discredited the civil service or had joined in the alleged plunder of the economy, and were popularly known to be subservient and loyal to the conjugal dictators.

However, when the purge and personnel changes turned into obvious witchhunts; and when ministers of the Aquino government started to put their own people (relatives, friends, supporters) in the civil service to replace those being dismissed or forced into retirement; and when personnel were indiscriminately dismissed and replaced by people not as competent as nor more qualified than those being removed, pervasive demoralization and protest in the civil service ensued (Egunsola 1987: 4).

The purge was condemned as unjust and unfair as it wrecked the civil service hierarchy, virtually not respecting its political neutrality and career tenure as it booted out competent personnel, even those occupying lower level positions. Many civil servants perceived the purge as an opportunity for spoils and political patronage rather than selective weeding out of "undesirables" and "incompetents."

The other corollary measure undertaken was reorganization. Spearheaded by the Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization (PCGR), the intent of the effort was to keep the bureaucracy "lean and clean." To achieve this goal, the strategies adopted were reduction of personnel, elimination of red tape, and eradication of graft and corruption. Especially targeted for abolition were the policy of allowing government officials to hold multiple posts¹⁷ (Danao 1986) and the "honoraria bureaucracy" which had shackled all foreign assistance projects.

Unlike previous reorganization bodies, the PCGR was dominated by representatives of the private sector. Of the survey teams, 78% of members (n=74) were private sector consultants and 22% (n=21) came from the government sector. A number of people from the academe claimed that "the work of the PCGR was a reflection of the private sector perspective." The scope of the PCGR's authority covered the Executive Branch, government-owned and -controlled corporations, and local governments. The imprint of the private sector on the direction of government after the reorganization can be seen in the policies for deregulation and privatization, which are in sharp contrast to the dictatorship's overregulation and control through crony capitalism.

The reorganization effort added a new source of fear and insecurity among civil servants. The public pronouncements of Chairman Luis Villafuerte provided cause for alarm: "Those hired purely for political reasons and others found incompetent would definitely be fired;" "Agencies, particularly those used as "tools of inequity and oppression" by the Marcos administration would be abolished;" and "Likewise, agencies and offices with overlapping functions would be trimmed down to streamline and rationalize their operation" (Montejo 1986). He later softened these veiled threats to the civil service by saying that the government was proceeding with the reorganization with extreme caution and prudence.

Instead of trimming the bureaucracy, the number of government employees actually increased after the reorganization (Cariño 1992: 132). As Cariño (1992: 132) further noted, the number of new appointments exceeded the number of terminations resulting from the reorganization. Personnel increased by 48,974 in the 39 agencies that underwent reorganization with 88 percent completion rate as reported by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) on 25 January 1989. A detailed scrutiny of

... eleven agencies and 92 public enterprises (of which two and five were abolished, respectively), a total of 16,341 were separated from the service from March 1986 to June 1987. These included personnel summarily dismissed as well as those who voluntarily resigned or retired. It was difficult to estimate the total number of the purged [employees] unless one went from agency to agency (Cariño 1992: 132).

The sincerity of the PCGR and of the Aquino government to pursue the goals of reorganization like economy and greater efficiency was however suspect. Several ministries (now departments) such as Foreign Affairs, Budget and Public Works, had five Undersecretaries by 1987 compared to only one or two before and during martial law. Even the number of Assistant Secretaries who reviewed paper work before passing on to the Undersecretaries had also increased. The increase in the number of top officials definitely was not an economic measure nor did it trim down the bureaucracy. The PCGR had not moved government agencies to better coordination, but rather changed it into a top-heavy structure uneconomical to maintain. The PCGR was seen by the civil service as a way of paying political debts to supporters of the Aquino regime.

The effects of the combined efforts of purging and reorganization on the perception, morale and behavior of civil service personnel were aptly and vividly captured by a Nigerian student and observer of Philippine public administration when he wrote:

The resultant effects of these measures on the behavior of the civil servants were marked and profound. Not only had their jubilation at the coming of a new regime suddenly turned sour; in fact, their own long and silent sufferings as victims of the Marcos era were not acknowledged by

the leaders of the new order. Furthermore, their feeling of job security and career tenure had been shattered.

The morale of the civil service became seriously affected. It became not only traumatized and demoralized but also terror stricken by the sword of Damocles in the form of "pending reorganization" dangling over their heads and which could legally "reorganize" them out of employment.

This invariably further affected the performance of the bureaucracy which had been described in the past as not satisfactory under Marcos. There was paranoia everywhere. The resultant consequence in the behavior and performance of the civil servants is contrary to what was supposed to be the goal of the measures: which was a reorientation of the bureaucracy towards the concept of government service anchored on honesty, integrity, morality, sincerity, and efficiency, which the revolutionary government claimed has been eroded in the past and wanted to restore. With incompetent and unqualified officials replacing mediocre ones, it only succeeded in eroding what little was left of those virtues in the old bureaucracy. An atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion was also prevalent between the old civil servants who were spared, and the new ones that were brought in (Egunsola 1987: 5).

The very political manner utilized by the Aquino government to refashion the bureaucracy toward its goals of governance destroyed the traditional political neutrality of the civil service and consequently, it failed to provide stability and continuity in the political transition.

The embattled civil service found an ally in the Senate which proposed Senate Resolution No. 14 dated 9 October 1987 suspending reorganization and the consequent termination of employees for 60 days. Although this resolution was finally voted down in the Senate, this prompted President Aquino to issue a 60-day moratorium on removals on 14 October. This was an action that almost replicated what the employees and senators really wanted (Cariño 1993: 134).

NEDA (1988: 13-19) admitted that the reorganization efforts of the government failed to win the support of the people because of its flawed approaches and perceived distortions in implementation.

Incoming political appointees¹⁸ and volunteers who came mostly from the private sector, cause-oriented groups, human rights crusaders, and avowed anti-dictatorship aggruppments were viewed with mistrust by the remaining members of the bureaucracy. The new recruits were perceived to be arrogant, ignorant of government's working environment, culture and procedures since many of them came from the private sector. Businessmen who financed the parliament of the streets as well as the Aquino election campaign replaced Marcos' former cronies.

On the other hand, the newly appointed Ministers and their Deputies, including the volunteer staffs they brought with them, viewed the civil servants as corrupt and inefficient collaborators of the old regime.

During the Marcos regime, there was apparent militarization of the bureaucracy whereby military officers were appointed to top and sensitive civilian posts. However, in the Aquino reorganization, priority appointments were given to marchers in pro-Aquino rallies and demonstrations (Soriano 1987).

The frequent changes in the Cabinet and sub-cabinet appointments confused the lower bureaucracy and the transacting public. They added to the anxiety and insecurity of the department personnel as they said with resignation, *bagong pari, bagong ugali* (a new priest has new ways). The frequent *rigodon*¹⁹ of top officials made interpersonal adjustments difficult.

This prevailing administrative culture at the onset of the Aquino administration did not augur well for improved government services delivery. The demoralized civil service personnel, reeling under the pressure of a shattered future in careerism, tenure, and job security could not be expected to render peak performance. The ongoing reorganization, which had left the sword of Damocles hanging over their heads, constrained career civil servants to seek patronage and political connections or *padrinos*, to manage to stay. Others became *balimbings* (instant turncoats) or *sipsip* (ingratiators) and entrenched themselves anew under the wings of the new masters.

Looking at the executive-bureaucracy relationships during the period of the revolutionary government, Dr. Ledivina V. Cariño (1987) precisely described it as a one-sided romance. President Aquino, by her actuations and reliance on private sector assistance during this period, showed that she had complete distrust of the bureaucracy which she perceived to be a Marcos-created monster.

The Civilian Bureaucracy's Perception of Aquino: Bias Toward the Military

As the civil service part of the bureaucracy welcomed the Aquino government, the new regime distanced itself from it and responded with reorganization, personnel purge and dismissals, calls for resignation, and the removal of security of tenure (Cariño 1986).

In contrast, its military counterpart, an active partner and co-administrator of martial law, was warmly cheered with the endearing words "welcome home, my soldiers."²⁰ This attitude of the Aquino government may be interpreted as its recognition of the catalyst role of the military in the EDSA revolution. The new political order assumed that the discredited image of the civil service was the doing of the ordinary civil service personnel rather than of Marcos' political appointees and technocrats. The truth is: a large majority of public employees joined in the dissent and condemnation of the abuses committed under martial law. A large number of them voted Corazon Aquino to the Presidency!

Assuming that some civil servants collaborated with the Marcos regime, their actions paled in comparison with the abuses of the military by their acts of salvaging, hamleting, and violations of human rights. For reasons they could not explain, the civil servants felt slighted to see the Aquino Government prefer the military as its partner in governance. It added insult to their injury when the hand of reconciliation was extended to the military, the rebels, and the Marcos loyalists, but not to the civilian bureaucracy.

The preferential bias of the new regime toward the military was first noted when the hand of reconciliation was extended to it. Then, it was made more pronounced with the concessions granted to the military such as: a system of career progression and promotion, increases in pay, allowances and incentives, and letting them participate in critical decisionmaking.

Meanwhile, the Aquino government turned a deaf ear to the civil servants' clamor for similar treatment or "new deal." It pushed through with dismissals from the service despite public pronouncements to the contrary and granted a pittance of ten percent pay adjustments as against the huge salaries given to top national officials ranging from the president, vice-president, Cabinet members, Career Executive Service Officers, and agency directors, and members of the Judiciary (E.O. No. 152, 1987). Disarray in the civil service in regard to career progression and promotion, as well as in participation in policy and decisionmaking continued. Technically, no recruitment nor promotion could be made while the bureaucracy was being reorganized.

To add further insult to the injury, the legislation of increases in the basic pay, allowances, and housing and commissary privileges of members of the armed forces after the 28 August coup, led civil servants to assume that acts of hostility against the State are rewardable under the new dispensation.

Developments in the transactions between the military and the Aquino government attested to the latter's continued "wooing" of if not "romancing" with the former. Compared to its actuations toward the civil service, the Aquino government showed better treatment of the military. The military, in the transition to redemocratization, received more positive reward than its civilian counterpart.

The public employees also sought concern for their welfare by the President and her administration as they felt neglected vis-a-vis the military, the new political appointees, and even the coup plotters, NPA rebels and Muslim secessionists. "The President says that she is concerned, but in her actions, *balewala naman tayo* (we are nothing). *Mabuti pa ang mga rebels at coup plotters, natatangko, pero tayo hindi* (the rebels, coup plotters are treated better, but not us)." These were some of the sentiments of the civil servants.

The Administrative Culture under the Freedom Constitution: 1986-1987

What was the state of the bureaucracy under Aquino? As very correctly captured by Dr. Cariño in her observation, the Aquino regime and the bureaucracy to a large extent, were still uneasy partners in a "shotgun marriage" relationship where no one could get out (Cariño 1987). The Aquino government was under extreme pressure to accomplish so much within so short a period of time. Some political analysts and public administrationists claimed that it had been denied a transition period to restore things to normalcy.

Its attempt to cut short the process of transition from dictatorship to redemocratization while, at the same time managing the governmental machinery to deliver services, resulted in inconsistent policies, unclear definition of goals, and poor implementation. Its initial and persistent distrust of the bureaucracy caused its failure to capitalize on the civil service resources, technology, and experience to steady the fledgling new political order and to assist in its efforts for change.

The high hopes and expectations among civil service personnel generated by the successful ouster of Marcos and the subsequent installation of the Aquino government deteriorated into despair and disappointment.

Civil servants even pointed to similarities under Marcos and Aquino in regard to the level of inefficiency, graft and corruption, callousness to civil servants' needs and demand for decent wages, and political patronage. Others even cited deterioration in public services due to timid political will and inefficient implementation of policies. Some employees, who were not in the mainstream of corruption, but who received *balato*²¹ from the grafters, recalled the "good old days" with nostalgia. Corrupt officials and employees who did not welcome Congress, which had been empowered to investigate their acts at various decision levels, sorely missed the days under Marcos when *His* or *Her* approval was sufficient.

Members of the civil service also entertained the general view that the bureaucracy had remained largely inefficient and bloated; that graft and corruption was on the rise rather than being contained as was popularly claimed. There was also the general perception that the President was honest and sincere and working for the interest and general welfare of the people, but that her officials and subordinates did not follow her leadership by example. Nevertheless, Santiago (1988) also expressed hopefulness in fighting graft and corruption with the appointment of administrators with probity and courage, who were given extra benefits for holding sensitive positions.

Government employees have also assumed a more active role in fighting graft and corruption. As Gaffud (1994: 41-65) vividly documents in her case study, a rank-and-file employees' union was instrumental in uncovering graft and corrupt practices in their agency. In summary, the corrupt practices committed ranged from overpricing, too much quantity purchased thus ending up unutilized, use of "unique" and technical descriptions in classifying the items purchased in order to avoid detection. The union was most helpful in gathering evidence and documents for the suspected anomalies.

The civil servants also perceived the bureaucracy to be highly politicized. The transition period under the Freedom Constitution, popularly viewed to be a *rigodon* of political appointees and followers, only saw an erosion of confidence in the sincerity of government to remove the vestiges of dictatorial rule. Instead, there was widespread demoralization and an apparent hopelessness.

Likewise, the bureaucracy was confused as to its role in the Aquino government; and in regard to its relationship with political appointees who variably came from the private sector, human rights groups, the church, and freedom fighters against Marcos. The Aquino reorganization was perceived as not having achieved rationality in government. Instead, it was seen to be responsible for glaring disparity in salaries; biased treatment of civilian and military personnel; confusion and blatant disregard of merit in appointing officers-in-charge; and further bloating of the bureaucracy with its recruitment of non-career personnel for career positions. Even NEDA (1988: 13-19) had to admit that were flaws and distortions in the actual implementation of reorganization plans formulated by the PCGR task forces.

There was clamor for rationality in the dismissal and reinstatement of employees; and for those who remained in the service, higher salaries and the restoration of the merit system in such personnel actions as recruitment, promotion, and separation.

The demoralized civil servants were further incensed that the *bulong, tayo-tayo* and *palakasan* system²² appeared to be at work again. This meant that, as in the previous regime, each employee was left on his own to seek *padrinos* in Congress or friends of the top officials who would recommend him to a job in government.

Foremost in the minds of public employees was the question of when they were to receive equal treatment from a government which professed the values of equity, morality, and justice. It was not too late for the Aquino Administration to woo the bureaucracy.

Lessons Learned from the Philippine Experience in Administrative Culture and Political Change

The Philippine drama and experience over more than twenty-five years vividly portrayed the dynamics and interaction between political change and administrative culture. As presented at the start of this chapter, lessons derived from the experience could shed light on the following issues: (1) bureaucracy relations; (2) political control of programs and personnel; (3) kind of administrative culture that may develop as a consequence of (1) & (2); and (4) effects of the administrative culture under the Aquino administration on employee morale, behavior and performance.

New Regime-Bureaucracy Interaction and Relation

The trust and confidence placed by the new political leadership in the bureaucracy it had inherited from the past administration lessens the conflict and tension between the new regime and the bureaucracy as was the case under the Macapagal administration; while distrust between the two parties produced tense relations especially during transition as shown by the Marcos and Aquino administrations, particularly after abnormal political changes such as martial law and the EDSA revolution, respectively.

The rapport between the two parties hastens and contributes to the stability of the new administration and ensures continuity of government services delivery through the bureaucracy. The feeling of trust obtaining in the new regime-bureaucracy interaction becomes mutual and beneficial for both parties as they go through the process of the "accommodation cycle."

The method and direction of political change directly affects the nature/kind of regime-bureaucracy relationship. When effected through the electoral process, the regime-bureaucracy conflict may be avoided by a more trusting posture on the part of the new leadership as in the case of President Macapagal's administration. But when the method of the political takeover has been made through the declaration of martial law, or a people power revolution, the atmosphere of distrust ensues and the next move of the new regime is to consolidate and tightly control its hold on political power, as in the Marcos and Aquino administrations.

As the new political leadership entrenches itself in power, its contending bureaucratic power can be neutralized or totally be placed under the political control of the new leaders under conditions of absolute political powers as in a dictatorship.

Several methods of control of bureaucratic power can be used by the political leadership like complete control of personnel covering all entities and all levels of

the bureaucracy through courtesy/demand resignations and presidential control of appointments; creation and use of counter bureaucracies such as project management, task forces, honoraria bureaucracy, and use of the military as an alternative to the traditional civilian bureaucracy; and complete control of policy and program structures and processes by sidetracking the traditional bureaucratic power and expertise, utilizing rather and relying heavily for policy and program inputs on the alternative or counter bureaucracies.

As shown by the long-drawn control of political power by a dictatorship, the traditional political party system as a means to gain political control and share power with the Legislature has disintegrated. A widening credibility gap also develops when a political leadership in power (Marcos) does not practice what it preaches, or acts differently or oppositely from its policy pronouncements during a prolonged period of time.

The succeeding Aquino regime, on the other hand, had to rely on coalition opposition groups to wrest political control. As in the past administrations, the involvement of big money in politics and the reliance on various interest groups in order to ascend to power contributed to the issue of executive staffing and to the increasing reliance of the political leader on transient political appointees (high-level spoils) for positions formerly filled by long-term civil service professionals. This tendency and practice had considerable influence on the new regime-bureaucracy relation.

The Aquino regime also saw the people's break-away from established political dynasties and the ushering in of the "new politics" through the election of political unknowns backed by small money to congressional and local government positions.

Control of Programs and Personnel by the Political Leadership

The new administration needs to control programs and personnel in order to assure that its policies and programs have the support of the personnel who are to implement them. Executive staffing revives the old issues in the civil service: that of balancing partisan political appointees and merit-based career civil servants; and the extent of participation of careerists in policy deliberations and of partisan appointees in program implementation and administrative management.

To make the bureaucracy responsive to the new policies and programs under the new political leadership, the new regime intended to gain political control of the bureaucracy and its personnel. The strategies of mass layoffs of the political supporters employed by the past administration, personnel purges, and reorganization of the bureaucratic machinery were usually employed. The Philippine experience shows that such means do not achieve their intended

results, but often creates more personnel inefficiencies and negative administrative culture and behavior, and leads to more politicization of the bureaucracy. General demoralization ensues among the personnel due to the feeling of insecurity as to their job, tenure and career.

Administrative Culture and Emergent Regimes

Any new political order brings to the regime-bureaucracy relation its own political culture. As the bureaucracy accommodates and eventually trusts the new regime, an administrative culture supportive of the political leadership ensues. However, under absolute political power of the regime over the bureaucracy, it becomes more its victim rather than partner in policy and program formulation and implementation.

The measures to gain control of the programs and personnel employed by the new regime such as purges, reorganization and administrative reforms generate a negative administrative culture until the regime-bureaucracy relation attains equilibrium as it goes through the cycle of accommodation.

This study has shown that the state of the relationship is directly related to the administrative culture it generates, which in turn affects the nature and quality of government services that the civil service delivers during transition. With the increasing politicization of the bureaucracy and participation of political appointees in program implementation, a "neutral" civil service is difficult to maintain. Hence, every political change in leadership becomes a process of transition and accommodation which aims to make several bureaucratic changes and reforms before the bureaucracy can be "on the go," thereby diminishing the bureaucratic capacity for developmental and maintenance functions due to partisan domination of the civil service.

The Philippine experience also points to a suspicion that the changes undertaken by any new political leadership are geared more toward gaining political mileage for a shot at a second term or perpetuation in power rather than the attainment of the policy and program goals it has set for itself for the benefit of the people.

As the real motives or hidden agenda of a new regime are revealed, a negative administrative culture characterized by inefficiency, poor performance, graft and corruption, low employee morale and negative bureaucratic behavior also affect the public service negatively. When the political leadership leads in the systematic plunder of the national economy, practices high spoils politics, and uses the bureaucracy to perpetuate itself in power, as in the case of the Marcos regime under martial law, the bureaucracy and its personnel retaliate against the regime.

People Power as Supreme over Political and Bureaucratic Power

The Philippine experience poses the greatest challenge in political development: how the people, as the ultimate source of political and bureaucratic power, could subordinate and control such power to serve the people's welfare. It is believed that the military-instigated EDSA revolt against President Marcos could not have succeeded had the people remained indifferent. The fact is the people really initially thought that the break-away of Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile and Chief of Staff Fidel V. Ramos from Marcos was a "grand *palabas*" (only a great show).

But after the call of Cardinal Sin and when people from all walks of life massed at EDSA to confront the Marcos forces, the show of force against Marcos turned the tide against his regime. The display of "people power" which brought down the twenty years of Marcos rule proved the supremacy of people power over political and bureaucratic power. This lesson is the first of its kind displayed by a long oppressed and dormant real power, the people.

The Philippine experience also brought to focus the culture component of public administration. It is interesting to apply the culture perspective in studying and understanding the political change and administrative culture which manifested itself during the administration of the last three regimes of Philippine Presidents.

Endnotes

¹*Lagay* is a vernacular term which is equivalent to bribery or giving of grease money. However, personnel in the civil service often qualify or even rationalize that the practice is not a form of graft and corruption but a form of gratitude especially when given after service has been rendered. When given before service has been extended, then it becomes *lagay*.

²The *alcalde mayor* was the provincial counterpart of the governor-general in the archipelago during the Spanish period. Since there was no career service during that time, the position of the *alcalde mayor* was usually up for sale to the highest bidder.

³*Pampangos* refer to those who are from the province of Pampanga, the home province of President Diosdado Macapagal.

⁴The 50-50 plan allotted 50 percent of new items to members of the House of Representatives and 50 percent to Malacañang to fill, provided recommendees fulfilled civil service eligibility and qualification requirements. This was conceived to allow regional or geographic distribution of new plantilla positions. The plan was kept secret from the Senate. However, on 9 July 1959, majority party leader and chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance Senator Gil Puyat sent one of his technical assistants to secure a position for one of his recommendees in one bureau, which happened to be one of those covered by the 50-50 plan. The bureau did not grant the senator's request and even showed the technical assistant a copy of the letters signed by Congressman Pendatun and Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Juan de Rodriguez regarding the said Plan. The next day the exposé made big news in the dailies. A thorough discussion of this can be found in Gregorio A. Francisco, Jr. and Raul P. de Guzman (1963: 105-135).

⁶During the previous administration of President Diosdado Macapagal, then Senate President Ferdinand Marcos repeatedly refused tax measures and a proposed law which would enable President Macapagal to avail of public borrowings. But upon assumption of the presidency, President Marcos reversed his stand on foreign debt, and raised the foreign debt to 81.9 billion at the end of his first year in office in 1966.

⁶Pork barrel funds are lump sums allotted to members of Congress which they could use, often for political reasons, like giving temporary employment to supporters who are paid their wages out of the "pork barrel fund."

⁷R.A. 5186 or the Investment Incentives Act, passed by Congress in 1967, provided various incentives and guarantees to domestic and foreign enterprises engaging in preferred areas of investments. In practice, however, the incentives in terms of tax holidays and remittance of profits abroad, were more beneficial to foreign investors. In 1970, Congress also passed R.A. 6135 or the Exports Incentives Act which granted additional incentives to export producers like tax credits, reduction of income tax for the first five years after registration, tax exemption on imported machinery, equipment and spare parts for five years after their registration and exemptions from the export tax.

⁸"Apo Ferdie" is an endearing nickname given by the Ilocanos to President Marcos who hailed from Laoag, Ilocos Norte.

⁹PLEDGES is the acronym for the seven-point-reform program of the New Society: Peace and order, Land reform, Economic reforms, Development of new moral values, Government reorganization, Educational reforms, and Social reform (Mijares 1976:190).

¹⁰To defeat the ban-Marcos proposal embodied in Constitutional Convention Resolution No. 3167 filed on September 16, 1971 by 22 delegates, Malacañang resorted to giving doleouts ("payolas"). Delegate Eduardo Quintero disclosed that he and many other delegates received envelopes filled with money in order to solicit their support to vote against the ban-Marcos proposal.

¹¹Common responses to the Study in Identifying Philippine Administrative Culture which are discussed in Chapter 3 of the forthcoming book *Administrative Culture and Political Change* (1995).

¹²*Compadrazgo* is Spanish term for a special relationship between families of a godfather/godmother, or principal sponsors in wedding and the godson/granddaughter in baptism and newly-wed couples. The same special relationship goes between and among the godfathers and godmothers and the sponsors at a wedding. This relationship makes for the extended family ties in Philippine society and also accounts for some practices of negative bureaucratic behavior in government. *Cronyism* was the practice of Marcos to use close associates as front men in the plunder of the Philippine economy through sequestration, takeover, crooked deals, as well as transfer of "ill-gotten wealth" to various financial institutions abroad, whereby the "cronies" got extra special treatment in return, especially in their transactions in government.

Palakasan is a common practice of using political connections and leverage in getting advantageous deals with government (contracts) or in getting employment, promotion, and political appointments to government positions.

Sip-sip is a subordinate who behaves in such a way as to please his superiors with the end-in-view of getting favors (a sip-sip is literally an ingratiator); while *bilihan* is outright purchase of positions but which is an exception rather than a general practice.

¹³*Palusot* is a Filipino way of dodging official responsibility or rationalizing an official action.

¹⁴Common *Tao* is a Filipino term for the ordinary citizen.

¹⁵*Hakot* system was a common practice during martial law to ferry government officials and employees to Marcos' rallies to assure "crowds" attending such rallies.

¹⁶The term "people power" refers to the joint military - civilian effort which drove the dictator Marcos out of power. Thousands of Filipinos coming from all walks of life heeded the call of Jaime Cardinal Sin to come and protect the Ramos/Enrile group which rebelled against Marcos in February 1986.

¹⁷In order to augment government officials' salaries, they are allowed to hold multiple posts concurrently. Available records on government corporations from COA show that the Marcos men held various posts simultaneously: Virata:21, Velasco:43, R. Ongpin:40, M. Alba:14, J. Aspiras:6, R.Cruz, Jr.:18, Jose Dans:12, R.del Rosario:13, J.P. Enrile:11, S. Escudero:12, Jobo Fernandez:13, J. Hipolito:16, J. Laya:25, Imelda Marcos:31, E. Mendoza:8, Blas Ople:11, Jose Rono:16, and J. Tanchanco:12.

¹⁸Except for Enrile and Ramos, Aquino's political appointees were drawn from the business sector, cause-oriented groups, human rights advocate and champions and those anointed by the Catholic Church. No career official was appointed to her cabinet as was the case of the political appointees during the time of President Macapagal. This may be because the political transition from Marcos to Aquino was an abnormal one. This may also be due to the pronouncement of Aquino to "deMarcosify" the bureaucracy.

¹⁹*Rigodon* is a Spanish term adopted in the Philippine political jargon to mean the frequent change in top political appointees to government positions in musical chair fashion. A sequence in the Spanish dance *Rigodon de Honor* calls for changing of partners as dancers go around a circle until they are reunited with their original dance partner.

²⁰Words of reconciliation from President Aquino to the military.

²¹*Balato* refers to small monetary amounts given from time to time to personnel who are not members of groups which derive "regular additional incomes" from graft and corrupt practices in their agency.

²²*Bulong*, *tayo-tayo*, and *palakasan* were practices allegedly used during the Aquino administration whereby appointments to government positions, or favors (political and economic) could be gained because of political connection without going through the regular bureaucratic process. These practices violated the espoused policy of transparency and openness of the Aquino government.

References

- Aquino, Belinda A.
1987 *The Politics of Plunder: The Philippines Under Marcos*. Manila: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines.
- Bonner, Raymond
1987 *Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy Making*. New York: Times Books.
- Cariño, Ledivina V.
1992 *Bureaucracy for Democracy: The Dynamics of Executive-Bureaucracy Interaction During Governmental Transitions*. Quezon City: U.P. College of Public Administration, International Center for Economic Growth, and the Philippine Institute for Development Studies.

- 1987 A Year After the People Power Revolution: The Shotgun Marriage Between the Aquino Government and the Bureaucracy. Manila, 9 March.
- 1986 Using the Bureaucracy As Is. Paper presented at the Seminar on Modernizing the Bureaucracy sponsored by *Solidarity*. Manila, 9 August.
- Civil Service Reporter*
- 1966 President Marcos Signs Police Bill: Subido Hails New Statute. 10(8) (August): 1, 8.
- 1961 Subido Averts Teachers' Lay-off.
- Danao, Efren
- 1986 How Can They Live on Their Salaries Alone? *Veritas*. 8 May.
- Dela Torre, Visitacion
- 1986 *History of the Philippine Civil Service*. Quezon City: New Day Publishers.
- Dubsky, Roman
- 1974 The Institutionalizing of Social Conduct and the New Society in the Philippines (Part II). *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*. 18(2) (April): 127-145.
- Egunsola, Paul
- 1987 The Influence of Political Change on Administrative Culture and Behavior of the Philippine Bureaucracy. Term Paper submitted in class PA. 224 (Human Behavior in Organizations). December.
- Espiritu, Augusto Caesar *et al.*
- 1978 Philippine Perspectives on Multinational Corporations. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Law Center.
- Flores, Ben Oliver
- 1966 Out with the Casuals. *Philippines Free Press*. 59(4). (22 January): 12.
- Francisco Jr., Gregorio A. and Raul P. de Guzman
- 1963 The "50-50 Agreement." In Raul P. de Guzman, ed. *Patterns in Decision-Making: Case Studies in Philippine Public Administration*. Manila: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines. 105-135.
- Gaffud, Dolores L.
- 1994 The Employee Union as an Anti-Corruption Instrument. *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*. 38(1) (January): 41-65.
- Guina, Carolina
- 1986 Preparing the Public Servant for the New Government. *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*. 30 (3) (July): 260-266.
- Heclo, Hugh
- 1977 *A Government of Strangers*. Washington, D.C.: Row Brookings I Institution.
- Macapagal, Diosdado
- 1968 Financing the Program. *A Stone for the Edifice*. Quezon City: MAC Publishing House.
- Marcos, Ferdinand E.
- 1975 The Practice of Government. Speech delivered at the Symposium Seminar on Good Government sponsored jointly by *Focus Magazine* and the Civil Service Commission. Quezon City, 24 November. Published by the Department of Public Information as Policy Statement No. 5.

- 1973 *Notes on the New Society in the Philippines*. Manila: Marcos Foundation.
- 1971 *Today's Revolution: Democracy*. Copyright by Ferdinand E. Marcos.
- 1966 Address on the State of the Nation (24 January). In Republic of the Philippines, *Congressional Record — House of Representatives*. Vol. I, Part I (No.1) (17 January - 22 April): 13-17.
- 1965 Inaugural Speech. 30 December.
- Mijares, Primitivo
1976 *The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos I*. San Francisco, Calif.: Union Square Publications, April.
- Montejo, Jimmy
1986 Many Government Contractual Workers to Lose Jobs. *Malaya*. 5 March.
- National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)
1988 *Philippine Development Report*. Updated.
- Paterno, Vicente
1973 The BOI: Its Role in Philippine Industrial Development. *Philippines Quarterly*. June.
- Payer, Cheryl
1975 *The Debt Trap*. England: Penguin Brooks, Ltd.
- Pfiffner, James
1987 Political Appointees and Career Executives: The Democracy-Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century. *Public Administration Review*. (January-February): 57-65.
- Reynolds, Quintin and Geoffrey Bocca
1965 *Macapagal: The Incorruptible*. New York: David McKay Co., Inc.
- Roces, Alfredo
1963 Light and Shadow. *The Manila Times*. 12 February.
- Romualdez, Daniel Z.
1959 Integrity in the Government. *Panorama*. August.
- Santiago, Fidel
1964 Scandalous Operations. *Philippines Free Press*. March.
- Santiago, Miriam D.
1988 The Culture of Corruption. Paper issued at the Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation. (1 September).
- Soriano, Rafelita
1987 Administrative Reforms and Innovations. *Battered Bureaucracy*. Manila: Solidarity.
- Stauffer, Robert
1986 The Marcos Legacy. *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*. 30(2) (April): 184-206.
- Subido, Abelardo
1972 *The Battles I Fought for the Civil Service*. Manila, Milestone Publications.

Tancangco, Luzviminda G.

1986 An Assessment of the February 1986 Special Presidential Elections: A Study of Political Change Through People Power: Executive Summary. Diliman, Quezon City. College of Public Administration, U.P.

World Bank

1980 Poverty, Basic Needs and Employment: A Review and Assessment. Confidential First Draft. January Cited in Walden Bello, *et al.* Development Debacle: San Francisco, Calif.: Institute for Food and Development and Philippine Solidarity Network;

Documents

Executive Order No. 1. Creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government. 28 February 1986.

Executive Order No. 5. Converting the Presidential Commission on Reorganization into A Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization, Reconstituting its Membership, and for Other Purposes. 12 March 1986.

Executive Order No. 151. Allowing Certain National Government Corporations to Continue the Practice of Paying Travel Allowances Based on Prior Years' Tradition. 19 March 1987.

Executive Order No. 152. Granting Salary Increases to Career Executive Service Officers of the Government. 25 March 1987.

Executive Order No. 153. Granting Salary Increases to Rank and File Government Employees. 25 March 1987.

General Order No. 1. Proclamation of President Ferdinand E. Marcos That He Will Govern the Nation and Direct the Operation of the Entire Government. 22 September 1972.

Letter of Instruction No. 11. Resignation of Presidential Appointees. 29 September 1972.

Letter of Instruction No. 14. Resignation of All Government Officials and Employees Facing Charges or are Notoriously Undesirable on the Grounds of Dishonesty, Incompetence, etc. 29 September 1972.

Proclamation No. 3. Providing for a Provisional Constitution. 25 March 1986.

Proclamation No. 1081. Proclaiming a State of Martial Law in the Philippines. 21 September 1972.

Republic Act No. 16. An Act Authorizing the President of the Philippines to Obtain Such Loans or Incur Such Indebtedness with the Government of the United States, Its Agencies and Instrumentalities, As May Be Necessary to Cover Budgetary Deficits And Other Expenditures of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for Rehabilitation and Other Purposes, And Appropriating the Necessary Funds Therefore. 18 September 1946.

Republic Act No. 1000. An Act Authorizing the President of the Philippines to Issue Bonds to Finance Public Works and Projects for Economic Development, Authorized by Law, and for Other Purposes. 12 June 1954.

Republic Act No. 1079. An Act Providing that Civil Service Eligibility Shall be Permanent. 15 June 1954.

Republic Act No. 1080. An Act Declaring the Bar and Board Examinations as Civil Service Examinations. 15 June 1954.

Republic Act No. 2260. Civil Service Act of 1959. 19 June 1959.

Republic Act No. 4860. An Act Authorizing the President of the Philippines to Obtain Such Foreign Loans and Credits, Or to Incur Such Foreign Indebtedness, as may be Necessary to Finance Approved Economic Development Purposes or Projects, and to Guarantee, in Behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, Foreign Loans Obtained or Bonds Issued by a Corporation Owned or Controlled by the Government of the Philippines for Economic Development Purposes Including Those Incurred for Purposes of Re-Lending to the Private Sector, Appropriating the Necessary Funds Therefore and for Other Purposes. 8 September 1966.

Republic Act No. 4861. An Act Amending Section One of the Republic Act Numbered One Thousand, Entitled "An Act Authorizing the President of the Philippines to Issue Bonds to Finance Public Works and Projects for Economic Development Authorized by Law and for Other Purposes," As Amended. 8 September 1966.